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Ethical Implications of Upāya-Kauśalya: 





Upāya-kauśalya has been examined as a hermeneutical de-
vice, a Mahāyānic innovation, and a philosophy of prac-
tice. Although the paternalism of upāya-kauśalya em-
ployed in the Lotus Sūtra has been analyzed, there is little 
attention paid to bringing these ethical implications into a 
practical context. There is a tension between the motiva-
tion, even obligation, to help, and the potential dangers of 
projecting or imposing one’s conception of what is best 
for others or how best to help. I examine this issue 
through various parables. I argue that ordinary people can 
use upāya-kauśalya and that the ethical implications of 
upāya-kauśalya involve closing two different gaps in 
                                                
1 I presented an earlier version of this paper to the American Academy of Religion at 
Baltimore, Maryland in 2013. Thanks to the audience there for their feedback. My 
thanks also to Adam Miller, James Mark Shields, Douglas Duckworth, Grace Buford, Er-
mine Algaier, Adam Valerio, Adrian Tiethof-Aronson, and an anonymous reviewer for 
their helpful comments. 
2 Department of Religion, Temple University. Email: kin.cheung@temple.edu. 
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knowledge. This has potential applications not just for in-
dividuals, but also for organizations like NPOs or NGOs 
that try to assist large communities. 
 
Introduction 
This paper examines the ethical issues that arise when ordinary beings 
apply upāya-kauśalya in practical situations.3 First, background is given 
on the term upāya-kauśalya and its use. Next, the ethical tensions and is-
sues that arise in upāya-kauśalya are examined through various parables 
in the Lotus Sūtra, the Therīgāthā, and examples from ordinary life. After 
elucidating the potential problems of hubris, paternalism, projection, 
and failure, I raise a hypothetical example to press these concerns, focus-
ing on the permissibility of deception. Next, I propose a solution of 
learning from textual uses of upāya-kauśalya by paying attention to two 
epistemological gaps: knowledge of how to help, and knowledge of the 
audience. Finally, I argue that our responsibility to help others comes 
from our ability to influence others, as well as its unavoidability. 
 
Upāya-Kauśalya 
The Sanskrit term upāya-kauśalya (Pāli: upāya-kosalla) is typically trans-
lated as “skill in means” or “expedient means” and usually abbreviated 
                                                
3 I am adopting the use of the term “ordinary beings” from the scholars I engage with in 
this paper who juxtapose ordinary beings with bodhisattvas and buddhas. I should 
qualify this term is not intended to posit one type of ordinary being, or a standard 
group of measure where some would fall below that standard. The use is to delineate 
ordinary beings, to which myself as the author belong, who have limited knowledge 
and wisdom, from bodhisattvas and buddhas with perfected insight and wisdom. 
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as upāya (“means” or “device”) when meant to refer to the entire com-
pound (Pye 8-12). In Sanskrit, the term has a neutral valence. According 
to Jay Garfield, “In Tibetan it is translated as thab mkhas, a term with val-
orizing connotations (indeed often conferred on monks as an ordination 
name), associated with a kind of wisdom (mkhas pa [khepa]), or pedagogi-
cal understanding” (272). Michael Pye proposes that English translations 
“tend to suggest a lower degree of ethical responsibility than should fair-
ly be ascribed to Mahayanists” (9) and it would be misleading to associ-
ate a “pejorative sense of deviousness” (10) with it as merely a device.4 
The negative connotation is most prominent in the modern usage of the 
Japanese translation as hōben 方便 meaning “expedient.” The Japanese is 
adapted from the Chinese, where the issue is more complicated. Though 
typically abbreviated as fāngbiàn 方便 (upāya), the full term is shànquán 
fāngbiàn 善權方便 (upāya-kauśalya). It is also rendered as shànqiǎo fāngbiàn 
善巧方便, qiǎofāngbiàn 巧方便, fāngbiànlì 方便力, quánfāngbiàn 權方便, 
quánbiàn 權便, and shànquán 善權 (Karashima 133). The word shàn 善 lit-
erally means “good” or “virtuous,” hence in the complete rendering of 
upāya-kauśalya, the connotation is positive. However, the most common-
ly used abbreviated rendering fāngbiàn 方便 leaves this crucial word out 
and has a neutral valence, meaning “method,” or a positive valence, 
meaning “convenient.”5 
These problems in translation aside, this Buddhist concept has 
mainly been studied as a Mahāyāna innovation used to introduce new 
ideas into Buddhism. Additionally, it has been examined as a hermeneu-
                                                
4 See Reeves, “Appropriate Means.” 
5 Although it is written the same way in Japanese and Chinese, Garfield misapplies the 
negative connotation of 方便 in the Japanese context to the Chinese, which is neutral, 
despite his footnote regarding instant noodles (方便麵) as distasteful when they are 
simply convenient (272n11). I agree with his larger point concerning how language is 
distorting but necessary, which is the context where he brings up upāya-kauśalya. 
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tical device,6 and a philosophy of practice.7 Pye points out that upāya-
kauśalya can refer to the teachings of buddhas and bodhisattvas that are 
meant to “help ordinary beings,” practices performed by ordinary beings 
“in order to make spiritual progress,” and much in between (158). To 
clarify the upāya-kauśalya performed by ordinary beings, Pye does not 
explicitly mention the use of it as a strategy to help others (which I will 
address in this paper), but rather he has in mind practices to cultivate 
oneself, such as chanting. Especially in the context of Mahāyāna, he con-
cludes, “In short, Buddhism is skilful means” (158). Not limited to 
Mahāyāna, the parable of the raft in the Pāli Canon suggests that all 
Buddhist teachings are upāya-kauśalya, that is, they are provisional and 
instrumental constructs that are abandoned after they have served their 
purpose. 
Another conversation on upāya-kauśalya, taken up by Damien Ke-
own and Charles Goodman, involves the ethical implications of its use 
within the Buddhist canon.8 Keown identifies the four aspects of upāya-
kauśalya as: the Buddha as a skilful teacher (found in the Pāli Canon), 
Dharma or text as skilful means (in the Lotus Sūtra), a bodhisattva’s prac-
tice (in the Vimalakīrti Nirdeśa Sūtra), and a source that allows bodhisatt-
vas to break precepts (in the Upāyakauśalya Sūtra) (“Paternalism” 202).  
Keown and Goodman consider the ethical aspects of upāya-
kauśalya in relation to issues of paternalism and potential for misapplica-
tion by teachers claiming to be bodhisattvas, which raises a need for de-
                                                
6 See Federman “Literal Means,” and McGarrity “Using Skilful Means Skilfully.” 
7 Schroeder, Skillful Means. 
8 Keown, “Paternalism in the Lotus Sūtra,” and Goodman, “Paternalist Deception in the 
Lotus Sūtra.” 
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fence of upāya-kauśalya.9 These are legitimate concerns, to be sure, but I 
wish to explore another direction and bring the conversation into the 
practical realm. 
 
Can Ordinary Beings Use Upāya-Kauśalya? 
Before that can be done, we must address a concern put forth by Peggy 
Morgan when she writes, 
What needs to be born in mind . . . is that upāya is an at-
tribute of those already perfect in ethics and insight, it is 
the seventh stage (bhūmi) of the bodhisattva path. This 
means that upāya is not presented as a normative path for 
all to follow but as something manifest in the activities of 
Buddhas and Great Bodhisattvas. (231) 
Keown also shares this concern and concludes that the examples of bo-
dhisattva usage of upāya-kauśalya in Buddhist literature require “inter-
pretation rather than simple imitation” (Nature 161). Part of his reason-
ing includes the end of the Upāyakauśalya Sūtra, which warns against 
transmitting this sūtra—filled with examples of the Buddha and other 
bodhisattvas’s application of upāya-kauśalya—to “inferior” sentient be-
ings.10 This sūtra ends with a message to keep the text a secret, which 
                                                
9 For instance, what differentiates the Tibetan teacher Chögyam Trungpa’s “crazy wis-
dom” of forcing two students to be stripped down (see Marin, “Spiritual Obedience”) 
from the Chinese Chan master Linji’s shouts and seemingly random whacking of stu-
dents with sticks? Both can be argued as upāya-kauśalya to bring the person out of their 
attachment to a sense of self, social norms, and conventions. Yet, at least to outsiders, 
the former is unacceptable to most and can be grounds for a lawsuit, whereas the latter 
is accepted and still practiced today in Chan and Zen traditions. 
10 I wonder if Keown would have softened his stance if he had access to Mark Tatz’s 
translation of the sūtra, published after the first edition of Keown’s monograph on Bud-
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seems like both a warning and a rhetorical device. To my knowledge, this 
sūtra has been copied and distributed openly, as it is not an esoteric text. 
The warning is legitimate, and “simple imitation” will not do. Yet, there 
still is room for ordinary beings to learn from upāya-kauśalya and model 
themselves after advanced bodhisattvas. This paper is precisely con-
cerned with how to interpret these actions in order to use upāya-kauśalya 
to help others. 
Gene Reeves disagrees with Morgan and Keown. Though Morgan 
focuses on the bhūmi mentioned in the Avataṃsaka (“Daśabhūmika” 
chapter), Laṅkāvatāra, and Śūraṅgama Sūtras, Reeves contends, “In the 
                                                                                                                     
dhist ethics. Tatz’s translation is based on two Tibetan sources, one of which is earlier 
than the Chinese source that Chang et al. translates from. Keown’s work cites Chang et 
al.’s translation, which renders the relevant passage as, “‘Good man, now I have fin-
ished explaining and revealing my ingenuity [upāya-kauśalya]. You should keep this a 
secret and not speak of it to lowly, inferior people who have few good roots. Why? Be-
cause, even Sravakas and Pratyekabuddhas cannot comprehend this sūtra, much less 
can lowly, inferior, ordinary persons believe or understand it. Ordinary people cannot 
learn ingenuity, and so the Sūtra of Ingenuity is of no use to them; not a single ordinary 
person can accept or practice it. ‘Only Bodhisattvas can learn and teach the doctrine of 
ingenuity.” Chang, A Treasury of Mahāyāna Sūtras, 464. Compare Tatz: “‘Son of the family: 
This explanation of the teaching of skill in means is to be kept secret. Do not speak of it, 
teach it, explain it or recite it in the presence of inferior sentient beings whose store of 
merit is small. ‘Why so? This teaching is not the stage of the auditors and independent 
Buddhas—what need to mention 
[variant in Tibetan source 1] foolish common persons who are in-
clined to something inferior (hīnādhimuktabālapŗathagjana)? [end 
source 1] 
[variant in Tibetan source 2] sentient beings whose store of merit is 
small (hīnakuśalamūlasattva)? [end source 2] 
‘Why so? They are untrained in this skill in means. Why so? They have no need for it. 
No one but a Bodhisattva great hero is a fit vessel for this teaching of skill in means; no 
one else is to be trained in this teaching.” Tatz, The Skill in Means (Upāyakauśalya) Sūtra, 
87. 
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Lotus Sūtra, it is not, as in some texts, just advanced or seventh stage bo-
dhisattvas who use hōben” (Niwano and Reeves 251). I agree with Reeves, 
who sees the stories of bodhisattvas and their use of upāya-kauśalya as 
examples for ordinary beings to follow. Edward Hamlin also expresses 
this sentiment in the context of Vimalakīrti’s use of upāya-kauśalya: “The 
Buddha seems to realize that Vimalakīrti is a more approachable figure 
for the average disciple, a character model one can actually hope to 
emulate” (161). Outside of upāya-kauśalya, Charles Hallisey and Anne 
Hansen provide examples of living Buddhists who derive ethical instruc-
tion from Buddhist stories. They “doubt that the configuration of ethics 
by such things as the limits of our knowledge about karma and its fruits 
can be expressed adequately in propositional form,” and instead propose 
that such ethical knowledge “can be learned only from narrative and 
life-experience itself” (321). 
In addition, the parables employed to illustrate upāya-kauśalya 
(especially those in the Lotus Sūtra), although filled with extraordinary 
moments, derive their force precisely from being realistic and relatable. 
For instance, the parable of the burning house, which will be examined 
in detail below, can be read as providing a practical lesson for the lay 
reader to emulate: if the house is on fire, one should use the best means 
available to save lives. 
This paper will focus on the possibility of ordinary people using 
upāya-kauśalya as a practical guide in everyday life. There is good reason 
that Keown and Morgan warn against it not being presented as a strate-
gy for all to follow. A major portion of this paper deals exactly with the 
issues that arise when ordinary people try to use it to help others. How-
ever, I argue that in attempts to help, ordinary people benefit from 
learning how to use upāya-kauśalya in order to better assist others. 
Upāya-kauśalya can be brought into practical life by attending to two 
gaps in knowledge. 
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Ethical Issues and Practical Tensions 
Before proceeding, I should clarify my definition of ethics and the ethical 
stance of this paper. I simply take ethics as the English word with a 
Greek origin, and morality, with a Latin origin, to refer to the same 
thing: the concern for behavior or character as good or bad, and the dis-
tinction between right and wrong. Some have posited special distinc-
tions between ethics and morality, with the former reserved for how an 
individual ought to live, and the latter concerning how one ought to 
treat others.11 However, there does not seem to be enough agreement on 
this distinction, or how to separate the domains of ethics and morality. 
Another common practice is to use them interchangeably, but I will stick 
with the terms ethics and ethical for this paper. 
More importantly, for Buddhist ethics, the above distinction is 
based on a distinction between self and other, a distinction that is ulti-
mately illusory and leads to duḥkha. Rather than characterizing Buddhist 
ethics as virtue ethics12 or consequentialism,13 I lean toward the more 
flexible stance that Buddhist ethics does not directly correspond to any 
one of the three major systems of Western ethics.14 Following Hallisey 
and Hansen, Garfield calls attention to the role of narrative in Buddhist 
ethics and how narrative context is vital to ethical assessment and de-
termining actions towards others (291-294). For the purposes of this pa-
per, ethical issues that arise from upāya-kauśalya are ones related to how 
                                                
11 Ronald Dworkin was one such prominent philosopher who made this distinction. See 
his Justice for Hedgehogs, 13. 
12 See Keown, The Nature of Buddhist Ethics. 
13 See Goodman, Consequences of Compassion. 
14 Garfield argues Buddhism can contribute to Western philosophy by providing an al-
ternative to the three major Western ethical traditions via grounding ethics in “our 
phenomenological orientation toward the world” (278). 
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one ought to behave toward others (noting that this self-other distinc-
tion is provisional, as is the case for ordinary, unenlightened beings). 
The tensions and problems that may arise from ordinary beings’s 
use of upāya-kauśalya in practical life addressed here are: (1) hubris,15 (2) 
paternalism, (3) the projection of needs, wants, or desires, and (4) a fail-
ure to help. These problems are not mutually exclusive, as all can hap-
pen together. A central theme that also runs throughout this investiga-
tion is the role of deception. These issues can be illustrated by parables, 
and we will now turn to the Lotus Sūtra’s parable of the burning house. 
 
Upāya-Kauśalya  in the Lotus Sūtra ,  Other Parables,  and Real 
Life 
A well-known episode makes up the core of chapter three in the Lotus 
Sūtra, titled “A Parable,” and is introduced by the Buddha as a simile to 
clarify the doctrine of upāya-kauśalya to Śāriputra. It begins with a father 
and his numerous children inside a burning house. Seeing the immediate 
danger, the father tells his children to exit. Yet, they do not heed as they 
are immersed in their play and do not comprehend the peril they are in. 
The father then uses his skillful knowledge of his audience to deliver the 
appropriate message in order to save them. Knowing they are fond of 
toys and carts, he tells them that outside the house are wonderful carts 
available for them to play with. Hearing this, the children fight to exit, 
and are saved. The father represents the Buddha, the children, sentient 
beings (specifically the pre-Mahāyāna audience), and the burning house, 
the duḥkha of saṃsāra. Most importantly, the use of upāya-kauśalya in tai-
                                                
15 The use of the term hubris is meant in the modern sense of excessive pride, not the 
older Greek usage of causing shame to a victim. My gratitude goes to Wakoh Shannon 
Hickey who suggested this term. 
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loring the message for a specific audience is to preach the Dharma for 
soteriological purposes. 
This is a commonly referenced parable in the Lotus Sūtra, which is 
one of the most popularly read, distributed, and studied Mahāyāna texts. 
The high popularity and familiarity of this story adds to the likelihood 
that ordinary people may emulate its illustrative use of upāya-kauśalya. 
The emulation in real life does not necessarily posit the agent to be as 
wise as the Buddha, nor do the dangers need to be life threatening. The 
assistance provided is likely mundane, not soteriological. Even if every-
one was to heed Keown and Morgan, and not attempt to emulate the fa-
ther, this does not take away from my main argument that in practical 
life one can benefit from a more reflective application of upāya-kauśalya. 
To illustrate the potential problems, let us suppose that a layper-
son familiar with the story does attempt to emulate upāya-kauśalya in 
life. In this parable, the father has complete grasp of the situation and 
his audience, and uses this to predict an appropriate method of re-
sponse. In life, however, perfectly certain knowledge is difficult, if not 
impossible to obtain. Herein lies the potential hubris: in practice, the 
agent attempting to help may claim the ability to see the dangers of the 
burning house, implying others cannot. 
This is only hubristic if the attitude of the agent trying to help el-
evates the agent above the receiver of assistance. Parents have more ex-
perience than their children, teachers have more knowledge than their 
students, and buddhas and bodhisattvas have more wisdom than ordi-
nary beings. Yet, there need not be an attitude of hubris. The issue is in 
the attitude of positioning oneself in such a stance that leads to the 
problems of paternalism. In other words, the problem with hubris, alt-
hough not unethical per se, is that it is the necessary condition for strong 
paternalism. Unreflective strong paternalism is unethical, but we will 
deal with this issue a bit later. 
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To better elucidate the problem of paternalism in this context, let 
us turn to another parable, this time from outside the Buddhist tradition. 
In Aesop’s Fables, there is a tale of The Farmer and the Snake: 
One winter a Farmer found a Snake stiff and frozen with 
cold. He had compassion on it, and taking it up, placed it 
in his bosom. The Snake was quickly revived by the 
warmth, and resuming its natural instincts, bit its bene-
factor, inflicting on him a mortal wound. “Oh,” cried the 
Farmer with his last breath, “I am rightly served for pity-
ing a scoundrel.” The greatest kindness will not bind the 
ungrateful. (Aesop and Pinkney 16) 
In Jean de La Fontaine’s adaption of this story, the farmer brings the 
snake home to warm up by the hearth. The snake wakes and threatens to 
attack, but the farmer manages to kill the snake with a swift chop of the 
ax. The message in both versions of the fable is clear: be careful whom 
you help. 
The message that concerns us here, however, is slightly different, 
and that is: be careful how you help. All four of the aforementioned po-
tential problems of ordinary beings trying to help others in practical life 
are shown in this story. The farmer’s belief that the snake needs, or 
would want, his help to get out of the cold shows hubris, paternalism, 
and a projection of the farmer’s own desires for warmth onto the snake. 
Although it may be the case that, ceteris paribus, a snake would prefer 
warmth to cold, the cost of being disturbed and unwittingly brought out 
of its environment is too high.16 Ultimately, although the snake is 
                                                
16 Wendi Adamek has explored the relation of La Fontaine’s fable to Buddhism and the 
environment from a different angle in her talk “Zen and the Environment: It’s Not 
What You Think.”  
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warmed, this attempt to help ends in failure, in both versions, for the 
farmer and the snake.17 
With the potential problems made more explicit, we can turn to 
real life examples. Ernesto Sirolli worked for an Italian NGO in the 1970s 
that tried to help Zambians take advantage of their fertile soil by teach-
ing them how to grow tomatoes. After much effort spent in producing 
them, the crops were eaten overnight by hippos. The locals were unin-
terested from the beginning and explained that this is the reason they do 
not focus on agriculture. In effect, the good intention to help had gone to 
waste due to the projection of what works for one situation, onto anoth-
er people in a different environment. This waste of time, labor, and re-
sources is especially egregious when the intended recipients are in dire 
need of assistance. Fortunately, Sirolli learned from this experience and 
founded the NPO Enterprise Foundation based on a principle to “only go 
where invited,”18 and his 2012 TED talk is aptly titled “Want to Help 
Someone? Shut up and Listen!” 
The next example comes from a psychiatric setting, where the 
agent listened sufficiently and was able to help his patient. Yet, even 
with success, this example raises the ethical issues of applying upāya-
kauśalya. The psychotherapist Milton Erickson treated a patient threat-
ening suicide in a most skillful way. He convinced a woman who had a 
fixation on the gap between her front teeth to use that supposed defect 
to her advantage in a quirky manner that actually helped her win over 
                                                
17 If we take these actions literally, warming the snake takes it out of hibernation, which 
suggests at minimum a nuisance for the animal. It is better to take these two stories 
figuratively, as the authors intend the snake to represent ungrateful, ignorant, or devi-
ous beings. 
18 Sirolli, “Africa and the first Enterprise Facilitation project in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo,” n.p. See also Sirolli, Ripples from the Zambezi. 
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her romantic interest.19 Crucial to this success was the need for Erickson 
to be opaque about his intentions as a therapist. If he revealed his hand, 
the patient would never have gone along with Erickson’s proposed plan. 
Though Erickson had copious clinical experience, he deceived his patient 
in order to help her. By deception here, I mean the broader sense of 
withholding information and causing another to (temporarily) hold a 
false belief, although therapists may not characterize Erickson’s work in 
this way. It is precisely in situations where lack of transparency is vital 
to assistance that the potential problem of paternalism shows up in us-
ing upāya-kauśalya. 
Paternalism can be defined as “the interference of a state or an 
individual with another person, against their will, and defended or moti-
vated by a claim that the person interfered with will be better off or pro-
tected from harm” (Dworkin “Paternalism”).20 A distinction should be 
made between weak and strong paternalism. The former is  
. . . the use of coercion or deception to get people who are 
for whatever reason not fully rational to do or allow what 
would be in their best interests. Weak paternalism is not 
nearly as controversial as strong paternalism, in which 
coercive or deceptive means are employed on normal, 
adult humans whose rationality is not impaired by any 
unusual conditions. (Goodman “Paternalist” 3) 
                                                
19 For the brief and fascinating account of Erickson’s brilliance with this patient, see 
Haley, Uncommon Therapy, 71-72. 
20 Dworkin’s Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry has other useful distinctions of 
paternalism such as hard vs. soft, broad vs. narrow, pure vs. impure, moral vs. welfare, 
and an alternative to Goodman’s characterization of strong vs. weak paternalism. The 
etymology of paternalism reflecting the relationship between a father and his children 
has bearing on the parables involving precisely these relationships. 
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Although I adopt the above distinction, a qualification is needed for the 
usage of rational and rationality. We risk assuming an ethnocentric defi-
nition of rationality, which may marginalize unconventional modes of 
reasoning and decision making, if we do not reflect on the grounds of 
valuing a Western, post-Enlightenment version of rationality. For some 
Buddhists, discursive rationality is not valued as highly as generosity, 
compassion, and wisdom, which are said to be beyond discursive think-
ing. For the purposes of this paper, I follow Goodman’s usage, which sug-
gests young children are not fully rational in the sense that they are bet-
ter served by adult assistance with their decisions. 
Goodman, like Reeves, and unlike Keown and Morgan, sees the 
potential application of the Lotus Sūtra in the real world, and argues con-
vincingly to defend the text’s uses of upāya-kauśalya as cases of weak pa-
ternalism, although they may appear to be strong paternalism. Richard 
Thaler and Cass Sunstein argue persuasively against misconceptions of 
paternalism and we will consider these later. Before that, let us return to 
one more parable in the Lotus Sūtra and then one in the Therīgāthā in or-
der to set up a hypothetical case that will press the worry of paternalism 
and other potential problems of upāya-kauśalya with more force. 
The parable of the physician appears in chapter fifteen of the Lo-
tus Sūtra, “Duration of the Life of the Tathāgata.”21 A physician is the fa-
ther to many children, who all become poisoned while he is away. Upon 
his return, he creates an antidote and those who are less clouded by the 
poison take it readily and are cured. However, some are too deluded by 
the poison to see the effectiveness of the antidote and refuse to be 
helped. Knowing his children, the physician departs, leaving the medi-
                                                
21 This is the chapter numeration of the Sanskrit version, with the chapter title taken 
from Kern, Saddharma Pundarīka. In the Chinese version, it is chapter sixteen, see Wat-
son, The Lotus Sutra. 
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cine with those still poisoned. He then sends a messenger to announce 
that he has passed away. Upon hearing this news, the rest of the children 
are so saddened, they snap out of their delusion and finally decide to 
take the medicine. They are cured and the physician returns to a house-
hold happy to see him. 
The text strongly emphasizes that the physician (like the Buddha 
who expounded pre-Mahāyāna teachings) is not guilty of lying or false-
hood. Although I understand this as doctrinal justification for Mahāyānic 
innovation, the physician clearly directed the attendant to lie. Yet, the 
message of the text is that he should not be charged with any unethical 
conduct in directing this lie. This is also the case in the parable of the 
burning house; the text emphasizes that the father there has not lied or 
committed falsehood. The father in the burning house has a stronger de-
fense against having lied because he manages to bestow the carts he 
promised his children. 
 
Upāya-Kauśalya  in a Non-Mahāyāna Source and a Hypothet-
ical Example 
The issue of lying and deception is even more prominent in this next 
parable, this time from a non-Mahāyāna source, hence without the com-
plication of Mahāyāna’s hermeneutical and religious innovation inten-
tions.22 In the Therīgāthā of the Khuddhaka Nikāya there are verses about 
Kisā Gotamī Therī, which are known as the (Buddhist) mustard seed par-
able. Dhammapāla explains this episode in his commentary. Kisā Gotamī 
is a nun who lost her child. Stricken with disbelief and sadness, she goes 
around carrying her deceased child asking for medicine and petitions 
                                                
22 See Federman “Literal Means” and McGarrity “Using Skilful Means Skilfully.” 
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the Buddha for help. In response, he says, “Go, enter the town, and at 
any house where yet no man hath died, thence bring a little mustard-
seed” (Rhys Davids 107). Hearing this gives her hope and she goes 
around to various houses in town. Though the spice is common, every 
household has also lost a family member in the past. She begins to real-
ize that death is inescapable, comes to terms with her loss, and petitions 
the Buddha to be his disciple. 
Though the Buddha’s response to her request is an imperative, 
which may technically not have a truth value, and therefore may not be 
able to count as a lie,23 it is clearly intended to deceive Kisā Gotamī in 
thinking her quest is at least possible.24 This is a case where deception is 
not ethically reproachable, but instead could even be ethically laudable.25 
                                                
23 For more on the problems with defining a lie, see Mahon, “The Definition of Lying 
and Deception.” There are multiple versions of this story, including one where the 
Buddha’s response is drawn out, promising her medicine if he can obtain special white 
mustard seeds. For a novel interpretation of this parable that mentions the ethical les-
sons of this narrative, see Bhushan “Toward an Anatomy of Mourning.” 
24 Intention (cetanā) plays a vital role in the Buddhist formulation of karma and in Bud-
dhist ethics. Doctrinally, buddhas and arhats no longer produce karmic results from 
their actions, thus are ethically permitted to use deception with an intention to help. 
The situation gets complicated with bodhisattvas who have enough good karma to bal-
ance out negative karmic consequences from wrong actions that provide for the great-
er good. Still, this balance isn’t a utilitarian calculation that simply cancels out the neg-
ative karma. See Keown, The Nature of Buddhist Ethics 115, 152-154, 181, and Garfield, 283. 
See also Webber’s “Liar!” for misleading with linguistic implicatures and an ethical dis-
tinction between deception by false assertion and by false conversational implicature. 
25 One of the practices along the Eightfold Path is right speech, which is addressed in 
the Abhaya Sutta. In the translator’s introduction, Thanissaro Bhikkhu summarizes, “In 
this discourse, the Buddha shows the factors that go into deciding what is and is not 
worth saying. The main factors are three: whether or not a statement is true, whether 
or not it is beneficial, and whether or not it is pleasing to others. The Buddha himself 
would state only those things that are true and beneficial, and would have a sense of 
time for when pleasing and unpleasing things should be said. Notice that the possibility 
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This deception, though, comes from the Buddha, who has perfect 
knowledge of his audience and the situation. Although the exact term 
upāya-kauśalya (Pāli: upāya-kosalla) is not used in the Pāli Canon,26 this is a 
clear use of it by the Buddha. Pye’s comprehensive monograph on upāya-
kauśalya has a chapter on its use in pre-Mahāyāna Buddhism and con-
vincingly shows upāya-kauśalya in the parables of the arrow, pith, water 
snake, and raft, along with the Buddha’s decision to teach the Dharma. 
After examining the mustard seed parable, we are in position to 
set up a hypothetical example to make more concrete the potential ethi-
cal problems in the application of upāya-kauśalya. Suppose your close 
friend is a cigarette smoker, who has expressed interest in quitting. Yet, 
perhaps due to lack of willpower or (biochemical or psychological) at-
tachment to the habit, your friend repeatedly postpones quitting. Her 
favorite New Year’s resolution is “I will quit . . . the following year.” 
Now suppose your friend discloses a new romantic interest in a 
mutual acquaintance. A thought arises in your attempt to use upāya-
kauśalya to help nudge your friend to commit to quitting. You are aware 
that the romantic interest is not a smoker, and wonder if you should 
suggest to your friend something you do not know: that the romantic 
                                                                                                                     
that a statement might be untrue yet beneficial is not even entertained.” Thanissaro 
Bhikkhu, “Abhaya Sutta: To Prince Abhaya (On Right Speech),” n.p. In the context of 
the growing number of studies on how meditation affects a person, it would be inter-
esting to see research on not just how meditation causes more compassion, but also 
how it affects lying and deception. To parallel the study done by Desteno et al. that 
asked if meditators or non-meditators will differ in giving up their seats to someone 
walking with crutches in visible pain (there was a threefold increase in display of com-
passion from 16 percent of non-meditators to 50 percent of meditators giving up their 
seats), one might design a similar experiment to put people in situations that pressure 
them to lie or deceive. 
26 The related term upāya kosallam is used once in a peripheral text as a list of three 
kinds of skill: skill in progress, regress, and in means. See Pye 118. 
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interest is averse to dating smokers. If you were actually sure this is true, 
the ethical problems will not arise. We can also modify this example to 
press the deception issue by positing that you have knowledge that the 
romantic interest is not averse to smokers. 
Knowing your friend well, you believe there is a very high chance 
that this deception will push her to follow through on her desire to quit. 
You are motivated to try this approach because your previous urges 
have fallen on deaf ears, yet you know your friend goes to extreme 
lengths to win over romantic interests. Should you deceive your friend 
in your attempt to help? 
The ethical issues start with a question of hubris. Though your 
friend has expressed interest in quitting, are you positioning yourself on 
higher grounds by considering it as in her best interest to quit as soon as 
possible, and that you are able to see this clearly, but she is not? This is 
related to paternalism because the action you are considering is to de-
ceive your friend in order to achieve what you believe to be an end goal 
in her best interest. This would be a case of strong paternalism because 
she is a fully rational adult, unlike the children in the parables, or the 
grief-stricken and temporarily irrational Kisā Gotamī.27 
Goodman argues, however, that this is not always clear-cut be-
cause we are not as rational as we like to imagine ourselves to be, or as in 
control of ourselves as we perceive, especially in the context of habits 
                                                
27 For an argument that even some instances of rational persuasion can be paternalistic 
when such persuasion is motivated by a distrust of the other’s rational capacities, see 
Tsai “Rational Persuasion as Paternalism.” 
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like smoking, which are wired into our neurology in the form of uncon-
scious cycles of cue, routine, and reward.28 
A related consideration to the question of hubris is to bear in 
mind Sirolli’s principle to only help when invited to do so. Has your 
friend previously asked for your assistance in committing to quit, and is 
your friend asking now? Kisā Gotamī actively asked the Buddha for assis-
tance. Yet, one can avoid hubris and is ethically permitted, in fact obli-
gated, to help others who have not asked for help if the situation is se-
vere, as in cases with children facing dangers of a burning house or poi-
son. 
Is there a projection of your own desires for her to quit, or your 
own desires for yourself to quit (either putting yourself in that position 
or recalling your previous bouts with addiction) onto your friend? 
To apply upāya-kauśalya, we should ask if this deception, in terms 
of lack of transparency, is necessary, as in the case of the therapist and 
the parable of the physician. The physician, like the father of the burn-
ing house, used deception as a second resort, but it was necessary for 
those deluded by poison. Deception as lack of transparency is also neces-
sary for the Kisā Gotamī example, and other parables in the Lotus Sūtra 
not mentioned here, including the parable of the lost son and the hidden 
city. In all these cases of deception, the intent to help is revealed after 
the target receives the assistance, thus not kept hidden forever. 
Is deception the best means to achieve your desired ends? How 
will your friend react if and when she is made aware of your deception? 
Will she reproach your deception, or will she be grateful, as in the cases 
                                                
28 For a host of studies that show everyday inconsistent and irrational decisions, see 
Ariely, Predictably Irrational, and for more on habit formation, see Duhigg, The Power of 
Habit. 
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of the children, the gap-toothed woman, and Kisā Gotamī? These are ex-
amples of difficulties that may arise when ordinary beings, without the 
knowledge and wisdom of buddhas and bodhisattvas, try to apply upāya-
kauśalya in practical life. There is a tension between the ethical obliga-
tion to help your friend, and the potential problems of this particular 
means of assistance. 
 
Potential Problems as Two Epistemological Issues 
Another way to formulate the tension is pitting the desire to help others 
against the uncertainty of the best way to help. Keown and Morgan’s 
qualification implies ordinary beings should stay on the safe side, and 
not assume they can use upāya-kauśalya without perfecting their ethics 
and insight. But how realistic is it for people to attain perfect ethics and 
insight? In slight contrast to Keown and Morgan, I propose that ordinary 
beings can apply upāya-kauśalya if they pay attention to two epistemo-
logical issues—namely, knowledge of how to help and knowledge of the 
audience. 
In the sūtras, buddhas and bodhisattvas use upāya-kauśalya be-
cause of a gap in knowledge. They know the Dharma, and ordinary beings 
do not. In their compassion and effort to help (perhaps an obligation to 
help, or from their perspective, which drops the self-other distinction, 
they have no live choice but to help) there is a need for some kind of 
upāya. The kauśalya comes in the form of how best to adjust and tailor 
the message appropriately for the audience to actually heed it. Involved 
in this is knowledge of the audience and their receptivity. 
Ordinary beings without perfect insight can better help others by 
reflecting on how best to close these gaps in knowledge. To obviate hu-
bris and unreflectively positioning oneself on a higher ground than the 
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target audience, one should ask what knowledge (usually leading to spe-
cific action) does one possess that can lead the subject to better their sit-
uation. In order to avoid projecting and imposing one’s desires onto the 
subject, one should carefully consider the point of view of the subject. 
Although this may initially seem like a platitude, ordinary beings often 
overlook this consideration. A great example of this in action is the 
American Zen teacher Bernie Glassman actively asking the homeless 
what they needed. Rather than project that they needed jobs the most, 
Glassman learned they were more concerned with childcare and receiv-
ing mail and phone calls.29 The One Laptop per Child project has brought 
attention to the need for a way to manufacture less expensive laptops to 
“empower the world’s poorest children through education” (mission 
statement). However, it has been criticized for supplying kids with lap-
tops when they would be better served with proper hygiene and nutri-
tion. Melanie Tervalon and Jann Murry-García provide another example 
of how the needs of those being serve can be neglected—a nurse believed 
she knew better than her patient whether or not the patient required 
attention for postoperative pain (118). They raise the important issue of 
paying attention to power imbalances of race, class, and gender in the 
setting of medical professionals helping patients, which can be extended 
to general attempts at assistance. Addressing these concerns will lead to 
dedicated efforts to understand the target audience and community and 
consider how best to transmit the knowledge that one has in a manner 
that the audience is ready to heed. 
The ability to do the above is present in ideal situations, where 
time to reflect, if even briefly, on these issues is a possibility. Some situa-
tions demand immediate reaction: catch the falling child first, and ask 
questions later. The more important message of this paper is that ordi-
                                                
29 See King, Socially Engaged Buddhism, 114. 
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nary beings are ethically obligated to help despite their limited 
knowledge. Not being perfected in insight should not prevent ordinary 
beings from emulating the Buddha’s and bodhisattvas’s use of upāya-
kauśalya. However, doing so is not a free pass to deceive others. Rather, 
one is urged to reflect on the intended target of assistance. This cannot 
be explicit enough: upāya-kauśalya is not for everyone, nor applicable in 
every situation. There may be no absolute guidelines for which situa-
tions allow for the use of upāya-kauśalya. Ordinary beings should not go 
around thinking they can break any precept or are above ethical codes, 
as this leads to an antinomian type of hubris. Rather, I am arguing that 
when one tries to help, one can benefit from modeling after how bodhi-
sattvas do it: by considering the audience. 
 
Paternalism Reconsidered 
The last issue to explore further is paternalism. Thaler and Sunstein ar-
gue against misconceptions of paternalism: that influencing others’ deci-
sions is usually avoidable, and that paternalism always involves coer-
cion. The latter is not remarkable given our earlier definition of pater-
nalism involving either coercion or deception. Still, Thaler and Sun-
stein’s point is important and relevant. They use the example of a 
“choice architect” who has the task of placing food along the aisles of a 
cafeteria. The way food is displayed, such as ordering and placing on 
eye-level, has an effect on people’s consumption and can increase selec-
tion by 25 percent. The architect has a few choices that include, but are 
not limited to, placing the food: randomly, in a way to maximize profit, 
or to nudge consumers toward healthier food choices (fruits and vegeta-
bles over junk food). They argue, in this and many other situations, in-
fluencing others is unavoidable, and thus it’s better to attend to choice 
architecture in a way that can best help others, even if what is best may 
be complex and not easily agreed upon. They advocate what they call 
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“Libertarian Paternalism,” which is transparent and gives people op-
tions. 
They also argue against the false assumption that people, most of 
the time, make choices that are in their best interest. Rather, people only 
make better choices on their own “in contexts in which they have expe-
rience, good information, and prompt feedback,” whereas they would 
benefit from expert help otherwise—“say, in choosing between fruit and 
ice cream (where the long-term effects are slow and feedback is poor) or 
in choosing among medical treatments or investment options” (9). 
Thaler and Sunstein show that paternalism is not always unethi-
cal, hence the need for careful consideration of the audience. Transpar-
ency and the ability to opt-out are preferred, but real life ethical difficul-




Ethical tensions arise in situations where different ethical interests con-
flict, such as that between the intention not to deceive and the responsi-
bility to help. To return once again to our hypothetical example of the 
permissibility to deceive your smoker friend, the best conclusion is: it 
depends on your assessment of your friend. That there is no clear-cut 
answer in tough situations for ordinary beings with limited insight is 
precisely the reason ethical cultivation is valued. It is not straightfor-
ward, and therefore, it is not easy. Few characterize Buddhist ethics as a 
rule-based deontological system, and for good reason, yet the lack of 
emphasis on duty and rules does not mean there are no ethical obliga-
tions whatsoever. Buddhist ethics lends itself more easily to virtue eth-
ics, emphasizing traits and characteristics to cultivate, and to forms of 
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consequentialism, where relieving duḥkha trumps all. Paying attention to 
the narrative dimension of Buddhist ethics emphasizes the intricacies of 
each particular context. The best response available always depends on 
the unique circumstances of that situation. 
This paper argues that ordinary beings can benefit from applying 
upāya-kauśalya in practical situations. Although we do not have perfect 
insight, we can learn from those who have and from their careful appli-
cation of upāya-kauśalya by directing our focus toward the subject of as-
sistance in a specific way. Looking at the issue in terms of how to best 
close the gaps in knowledge will lead to dedicated efforts toward under-
standing the target audience and transmission of knowledge, or delivery 
of assistance, without unreflectively privileging the agent over the tar-
get audience. To put this another way, we need to at least consider our 
fallibility in deciding what may be best for others. Although Keown and 
Morgan’s warning is well taken, we have an ethical obligation to help 
others precisely in our current condition of limited wisdom. Waiting for 
perfect insight would be wasting opportunities to help. Again, applying 
upāya-kauśalya does not necessarily permit the agent to use deception or 
any other such means. Rather, we must help without imposing. This has 
implications in the contemporary context where people with intent to 
help others do so without properly knowing their audience. This is espe-
cially important not only for individuals but also for NPOs, NGOs, and 
other organizations designed to help large communities of people whose 
immediate needs mean they cannot afford any unskillfully wasted, or 
worse, harmful attempts, no matter how good the intention. 
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